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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
M A U R I N E TAYLOR, J 
Plaintiff-Appellant, I 
\ Case No. 
VS
* / 13969 
K E I T H O'BRIEN, INC., V 
Defendant-Besjiondent. I 
B R I E F O F D E F E N D A N T - R E S P O N D E N T 
K E I T H O'BRIEN, INC., 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
The respondent agrees with the explanation of the 
nature of the case as provided by the appellant. 
D I S P O S I T I O N O F T H E L O W E R COURT 
The appellant's statement is essentially correct as 
to the disposition of the lower court. 
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N A T U R E O F R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
The respondent seeks to have the Judgment Not-
withstanding the Verdict granted by the lower Court 
sustained in its entirety. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The first three paragraphs of the appellant's State-
ment of Facts are essentially correct and undisputed. 
However, it should be noted that the entry way to the 
respondent's store is level and covered by the building 
overhang. (R. 183, 289). Additionally, the substance 
which was found in the entry way was a black, gritty 
substance. (R. 193). Thereafter, however, additional 
facts should be included. 
Mr. Beltz ,the manager of the respondent's store 
in question, testified that the maintenance employees 
were required to maintain and clean the area in question 
every morning prior to the store opening between 8:30 
and 9:30 a.m. (R. 208). There was no evidence pro-
duced by either party that the area was in fact swept 
the morning of the accident or that it was not in fact 
swept the morning of the accident. Mr. Beltz testified 
that this was the normal program which was followed. 
(R, 208). 
Upon being advised of the appellant's complaint, 
Mr. Beltz inspected the entry area of which the appel-
lant complained. At that time, the entrance was found 
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to be dry, with no signs of any moisture or anything 
slippery. The area was immediately swept and Mr. 
Beltz collected and observed approximately one-half 
(Y2) cup full of a gritty-type substance. (R. 209). 
There was no evidence introduced into the trial 
as to whether or not there had been a recent snowstorm 
in the vicinity of the respondent's store. 
Mrs. Hill, an employee of the respondent's store 
in question, indicated that the substance resembled that 
which is spread by the street department during snow-
storms. (R. 193). 
There was no evidence introduced at trial as to 
when the substance was placed in the entry way of the 
respondent's store, who placed the substance in the 
entry way of the respondent's store nor how long the 
substance had been in that area of the respondent's store 
prior to the alleged incident. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
U N D E R T H E L A W O F T H E S T A T E O F 
U T A H , T H E L O W E R COURT W A S CORRECT 
I N D E T E R M I N I N G T H E A P P E L L A N T 
F A I L E D TO M E E T H E R B U R D E N O F 
P R O O F I N P R O D U C I N G S U F F I C I E N T E V I -
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D E N C E TO E S T A B L I S H L I A B I L I T Y ON 
T H E P A R T O F T H E R E S P O N D E N T . 
The appellant failed to meet her burden of proof 
in providing or producing sufficient evidence to the 
Court below to establish liability on the part of the re-
spondent herein. Under the law of the State of Utah, 
it is clear that in order to impose liability upon the store 
owner and in favor of a business invitee, it must first 
be shown that a dangerous condition in fact existed 
upon the premises. The mere fact that the appellant 
fell on the premises of the respondent does not establish 
in any sense a prima facie case that a dangerous con-
dition existed. The existence of a "dangerous condi-
tion" is a requisite element here which appellant has 
failed to establish. The record is totally insufficient to 
establish this most necessary element. 
Even if a dangerous condition could be shown, it 
must be also shown that the condition was caused by 
an act attributable to the owner of the premises or that 
the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
existence of the condition and had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to remedy same, or that the condition had existed 
for such a time that the owner reasonably could have 
discovered and removed it. Koer v. May fair Markets, 
19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566; Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel 
Co., 3 Utah 2d, 364, 284 P.2d 477 (1955); Hampton 
v. Rowley Builders Supply, 10 Utah 2d 169, 350 P.2d 
151 (1960); Sears Roebuck $ Company, v. Barkdoll, 
4 
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8 Cir., 353 F.2d 101 (1965); Howard v. Auerbach 
Company, 20 Utah 2d 355, 437 P.2d 895 (1968); Long 
v. Smith Food Kings Store, No. 13252 Utah Sup. Ct. 
(October 4,1973), 531 P.2d 360. 
The plaintiff in Koer, Supra, had entered the mar-
ket at approximately 11:30 a.m. and while shopping 
in the store slipped on a grape which was on the de-
fendant's floor. The evidence demonstrated that the 
floor had been swept that morning at approximately 
8:00 a.m., approximately three and one-half hours prior 
to the plaintiff's fall. I t was further shown that the de-
fendant's store manager had been called from his office 
to the cashier's checkstand which required him to pass 
by the place where the fall ocurred just a few minutes 
before the incident. I t was not shown that he in fact 
saw the grape there or whether in fact the grape was 
there at the time he passed by the area. The Court 
stated that: 
I t cannot be disputed that a store owner is ob-
ligated to exercise ordinary care to keep the 
premises reasonably safe for the protection of 
those patronizing his store. The mere proof of 
injury within a store, however, does not raise, 
without more evidence, an inference that the de-
fendant had control or any notice of the object 
causing the injury within the store nor does it 
presume that he was negligent. I t is common 
knowledge that a store owner is not an insurer 
of the safety of his customers, (emphasis added) 
(See also De Weese v. J . C. Penney Co., 5 
Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956) 
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The Court held that in cases of this nature, in 
order to find the defendant negligent, it must be shown 
that the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reason-
able care should have known, of any hazardous con-
dition and had a reasonable opportunity to remedy 
that condition. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
was affirmed in favor of the defendant by this Court. 
In Howard v. Auerbach Company, Supra, this 
Court affirmed the lower Court's Order of Summary 
Judgment of No Cause of Action, holding that the 
store patron could not recover where there was no indi-
cation as to who had put some oil on an escalator step 
within the store upon which the patron allegedly slip-
ped and fell. There was no indication that the oil had 
been on the steps for such a time that the store people 
reasonably could have discovered and removed it. 
I n Long v. Smith Food Kings Store, Supra, the 
plaintiff sued for injuries suffered when he slipped 
and fell on a piece of pumpkin pie on the floor of the 
defendant's store. In that case, the Court affirmed the 
granting of defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment on the ground that upon the undisputed facts the 
plaintiff could show no basis for recovery. The plaintiff 
and his wife were shopping in the store when he slipped 
ad fell on a piece of pumpkin pie in an aisle seven to 
ten feet away from the aisle where the sample pies were. 
There was no evidence that any store employee, or in 
fact that anyone else, saw anything of that nature on 
6 
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the floor prior to the accident nor was there any evi-
dence to show that anyone else knew of the existence 
of the condition, how it got there, or how long it had 
been there. The Court held in Long, Supra, that the 
supermarket was not liable for the injuries suffered 
by the plaintiff in absence of evidence that any store 
employee saw anything of that nature on the floor prior 
to the accident or any evidence as to how the pie got 
on the floor or how long it lay there prior to the 
accident. 
The Court is confronted in the case at bar with 
exactly the same situation as is described in the above 
cited cases. There was no evidence produced at the 
trial of this matter that the respondent placed the sub-
stance in the entry way nor evidence that the respond-
ent knew of its presence. The evidence is to the con-
trary. Further, there is no evidence as to who in fact 
was responsible for placing the substance in the entry 
way nor any evidence as to how long the substance 
had been there. 
There is, however, evidence that in the normal busi-
ness practice of the respondent, this area was swept and 
maintained on a daily basis just prior to the opening 
of the store. This cleaning would have occurred ap-
proximately two to three hours prior to the plaintiff's 
alleged accident. This span of time is almost identical 
to the situation in Koer v. May fair Markets, Supra, 
where this Court held that: 
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We just cannot ignore the fact that the grape 
was only seen after the fall occurred. From 
these circumstances alone a ju ry would not be 
justified in inferring that the grape had been 
there for such a period of time that, had the de-
fendant exercised reasonable care, it should have 
known of its presence. 
The appellant states in her brief at page 5, that, 
"the cause of the fall in the case now before the Court 
was a black substance that seemed to spread on the 
vestibule. The fair inference is that the substance came 
in the vestibule when road crews attended to the snow 
and ice outside the entrance way and it was a condition 
which was recognized by the defendant and ordinarily 
guarded against." The record before this Court is tot-
ally devoid of evidence sufficient to base this assertion. 
There was no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that 
there was a snowstorm in progress at the time of the 
incident nor that there was a snowstorm that had occur-
red immediately prior to the incident. To the contrary, 
as set forth in the Statement of Facts, the evidence sub-
mitted by Mr. Beltz was that the entrance way was tot-
ally devoid of any moisture and that it was in fact dry. 
There absolutely is no evidence in the record which 
could be construed to indicate that the substance which 
was found in the vestibule area was "spread" upon the 
vestibule by employees of the respondent. And there 
certainly is no evidence in the record before the Court 
as to how the substance arrived in the area, when it 
was deposited there, who put it there or that the re-
spondent had any knowledge of its presence. Finally, 
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and most importantly, there is no evidence which estab-
lishes the existence of a "dangerous condition." The law 
of Utah is clear that the respondent is not an "insurer" 
of the safety of its business invitees. The mere fact that 
the appellant fell does not establish that a "dangerous 
condition" existed. Nor does it establish that the appel-
lant was negligent. Koer v. May fair Markets, supra. 
The appellant goes on to cite the case of De Weese 
V. J. C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 and 
asserts that this case is factually more in point with 
the case now before the Court than those above cited. 
Quite the contrary is the case. The De Weese case 
dealt with the question of whether a terrazzo entry way, 
when it became wet, was a dangerous condition in and 
of itself. The record was clear in De Weese, that the 
defendant knew of the slippery nature of terrazzo tile 
when wet and that it kept rubber mats or some abra-
sive ready for use during inclement weather. Thus, in 
De Weese, the defendant had notice of the condition 
of which the plaintiff complained prior to the accident. 
De Weese is therefore not factually in point with the 
case now before the Court. 
The appellant concludes in her brief that Mrs. Hill 
the respondent's employee, agreed with the appellant 
that the entrance way should be swept. From this 
premise, the appellant leaps to the ultimate conclusion 
that the existence of the substance in that area was not 
unusual. This logic is nothing more than speculation 
which is not supported by any evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower Court was correct in granting the Judg-
ment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The evidence pre-
sented by the appellant was clearly insufficient to estab-
lish liability upon the respondent. Under the cases cited 
herein, it would be incorrect to allow the ju ry to specu-
late as to whether a dangerous condition existed, how 
the substance arrived in the entrance area of the re-
spondent's store, when it was put there and by whom, 
or that it had been there for such a time that the re-
spondent knew or should have known of its presence 
and had adequate time within which to sweep the area 
clean. The appellant has failed to establish liability by 
a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the Judg-
ment Notwithstanding the Verdict should be affirmed. 
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